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Introduction
Economists traditionally assume that individuals are motivated only by their material self-interest. But experiments systematically reject the pure self-interest hypothesis;
see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a survey. Other considerations, like fairness, do play a role. If earnings are a combination of brute luck (drawn by nature) and e¤ort (chosen by the individual), then people are willing to compensate others for unlucky draws by nature, but also allow them to enjoy the fruits of their e¤ort. Empirical evidence shows that the more income is determined by luck, the more redistribution is preferred. Konow (2003) , Alesina and Giuliano (2010) , and Gaertner and Schokkaert (2011) provide overviews based on laboratory experiments, social survey data, and structured questionnaires.
Fairness considerations have been introduced in political economy models. Alesina et al. (2001) show that di¤erent beliefs about the importance of luck for income acquisition can help explain the divergence in redistribution levels in di¤erent democratic societies.
The political economy models of Piketty (1995) Other authors study the consequences of introducing preference heterogeneity directly in the optimal (utilitarian) income tax literature; see, Boadway et al. (2002) , Kaplow (2008) , Choné and Laroque (2010) , and Lockwood and Weinzierl (2012) . Contrary to Mirrlees (1971) , negative marginal income taxes-subsidies to the hard-working poormay be optimal.
Political economy models and fair income tax models traditionally focus on earnings only. There exist, however, di¤erent theoretical reasons to include also non-income information in the tax base. If externalities exist, then there is a role for government to subsidise or tax these activities à la Pigou (1920) to restore e¢ ciency. If there exist tags-observable, usually exogenous factors that correlate with unobserved abilities or 1 See also the comment on Alesina and Angeletos (2005) by Di Tella and Dubra (2013) and the reply by Alesina et al. (2013). tastes-then di¤erentiating the tax-bene…t system on the basis of these tags (sometimes called tagging) can also enhance e¢ ciency; see Akerlof (1978) for his seminal contribution. 2 The optimal income tax treatment of family size and couples also received considerable attention; see, e.g., Mirrlees (1972) and Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) for initial contributions. 3 In this paper, we study the design of fair and e¢ cient tax-bene…t schemes based on income and non-income factors under partial control. We preview the core ingredients.
Individuals di¤er in unobserved abilities and tastes. 4 Taste di¤erences bring the question of fairness-which inequalities are justi…able and which are not-to the fore. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) propose to keep individuals responsible for their tastes, but to compensate them for di¤erences in their abilities. Responsibility for tastes demands that the laisser-faire should result if all individuals have the same ability. In this case, di¤erences in outcomes can only be caused by di¤erences in tastes for which they were kept responsible. Compensation for abilities requires to approve of transfers from better o¤ to worse o¤ if these di¤erences in income are caused only by di¤erences in abilities (i.e., if they have the same preferences and exert the same e¤ort). We use a classical welfare function-a sum of transformed utilities-that satis…es the Pareto principle, compensation, and responsibility.
Besides income, we also model non-income factors. Both income and non-income factors are modelled as a convex combination of ability (drawn by nature) and e¤ort (chosen by individuals who di¤er in tastes). The weight de…nes the degree of control.
For some factors, think of an inborn handicap, the degree of control is zero, while other factors, think of earnings or family composition, the degree of control is positive and partial control applies.
The complexity of the resulting multidimensional screening exercise forces us to simplify several aspects of the model to keep analytical tractability. Besides a linear production technology under partial control, we assume quasi-linear preferences (de…ned over 2 Tagging has also been analysed by, among others, Immonen et al. (1998) and Salanié (2002 Salanié ( , 2003 . income, non-income factors, and e¤ort), independent multivariate normal distributions for abilities and tastes, and linear tax rates for the income and non-income factors.
Our results show that, in general, optimal tax rates balance the marginal e¢ ciency cost of taxation caused by tax distortions against the marginal net fairness bene…t of taxation. The latter is the di¤erence between the marginal compensation bene…t and the marginal responsibility cost of taxation. Higher taxes reduce outcome di¤erences between individuals with the same tastes, but di¤erent abilities-a good thing-re ‡ected by the marginal compensation bene…t of taxation. Yet, higher taxes also reduce the outcome di¤erences between individuals with the same abilities, but di¤erent tastes-a bad thing-captured by the marginal responsibility cost of taxation.
We also study two special cases in detail. In case only income is included in the model, we show, among other things, that the optimal income tax negatively depends on the degree of control over income. The tax must also increase with ability heterogeneity, while it has to decrease with taste heterogeneity. If we add a tag to the modelan observable non-controllable non-income factor, say, an inborn handicap-, then the optimal tax on the tag depends on the correlation between the tag and the unobserved ability to earn income. Introducing taste heterogeneity and tagging lowers the optimal tax on income.
Finally, we show how the theory can be tested empirically. We derive testable conditions for the tax rates on non-controllable factors in the general case. They turn out to be equal to the sum of the direct e¤ects of non-controllable factors on wellbeing augmented by their indirect e¤ects via the correlation with partially controllable factors. We also discuss how the theory can be empirically tested using happiness data.
We show that in this case, the theory obtains a simple structure that resembles equality of opportunity regressions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 discusses the main result. Section 4 and 5 study two special cases-income taxation and tagging-in detail. Section 6 returns to the general case and derives testable conditions. Section 7 concludes.
The model
We de…ne the basic building blocks-preferences and constraints-at the individual and the societal level. 5 
Individual preferences and constraints
Individual utility U (c; x; e) is a function of consumption c 2 R, non-income factors x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x J ) 2 R J , and e¤ort e = (e 0 ; e 1 ; : : : ; e J ) 2 R J+1 . Consumption c equals gross income y minus taxes (y; x), a function of gross income and non-income factors.
A production function f : R J+1 ! R J+1 maps e¤ort e into gross income and non-income factors (y; x).
The utility maximising problem of an individual can be summarised as max e U (c; x; e) subject to c y (y; x) and (y;
To keep the model tractable, we make the following simplifying assumptions.
1. Quasi-linear preferences. Utility is equal to consumption plus the value of nonincome factors minus the cost of e¤ort, or
This speci…cation is quasi-linear in consumption, as in Diamond (1998) , and excludes therefore income e¤ects. 6 In addition, the value function of non-income factors g and the cost function of e¤ort h have a ‡exible parameterisation, more precisely,
The vector captures the trade-o¤ between income and non-income factors in a simple linear way, so it extends quasi-linearity to the non-income factors. Without loss of generality we assume the non-income factors to be desirable, i.e., 2 R J ++ . The vector 2 R J+1 is a taste vector, de…ning the disutility of e¤ort. Higher values 5 We present an additive version of the model here. The appendix in Ooghe and Peichl (2010) contains a multiplicative variant with the same results. 6 Zero income e¤ects are often not falsi…ed by the data; see, e.g., the discussion in Diamond and Saez for correspond with lower disutilities of e¤ort, thus more ambitious individuals.
The vector 2 R
J+1
++ is an elasticity vector that controls the convexity of h. Higher values for correspond with more elastic responses to e¤ort and thus a higher cost of taxation.
2. Linear production. Gross income y and the non-income factors in x are under partial control, i.e., they are each a convex combination of e¤ort and ability. We de…ne y = 0 e 0 + (1 0 ) 0 ;
x j = j e j + (1 j ) j for j = 1; 2; : : : ; J;
with 2 (0; 1) J+1 collecting the weights and 2 R J+1 the abilities. The weights de…ne the degree of control of a factor, ranging from no control ( j ! 0; the factor is ability only) over partial control (0 < j < 1) to full control ( j ! 1; the factor is e¤ort only).
3. Ability and taste heterogeneity. Heterogeneity in abilities is modelled via heterogeneity in the vector . In particular, we assume a multivariate normal distribution, with = ( 0 ; 1 ; : : : ; J ) the vector of means and = [ jk ] the variance-covariance matrix, with jk = Ef( j j )( k k )g. 7 To model heterogeneity in tastes, we assume that the taste vector also follows a multivariate normal distribution, fully described by and . Note that abilities and tastes are assumed to be independently distributed. 8 This assumption avoids the philosophical problem whether we can keep individuals responsible for their tastes, if the latter correlate with abilities. Still, independence between abilities and tastes does not exclude that income and the non-income factors are correlated in complex ways. We will come back to this issue in detail in section 6.
Individuals know their abilities and tastes when choosing e¤ort. 9 Let e ( ; ; ) be the utility maximising e¤ort choice and c ( ; ; ), y ( ; ; ), and x ( ; ; ) the corresponding (net and gross) income and the non-income factors. 7 We exclude perfect correlation, so ( jk ) 2 < jj kk for j 6 = k. 8 Whereas abilities and tastes are heterogeneous, the degrees of control , the parameters in , and the elasticities are the same for all individuals. 9 The e¤ort choice would remain the same if individuals were expected utility maximisers that know their tastes, but only the distribution of abilities. Abilities can thus also be interpreted as risks.
Social preference and constraint
The social preference and its owner, the …ctitious social planner, are a proxy for a more complex political voting model. 10 The problem of the planner is to choose a tax scheme to maximise welfare subject to a budget constraint. Let R 0 denote an exogenous (per-capita) revenue requirement; the social planner's problem is
with W the welfare function and R the revenue function. The revenue function measures the average tax revenue, so R( ) = R R (y ( ; ; ); x ( ; ; ))dF ( ) dG ( ), with F and G the distribution functions of abilities and tastes. We make again some additional simplifying assumptions.
1.
Welfare. Welfare is a sum of transformed well-being levels, more precisely
with a strictly increasing transformation function and v( ; ; ) the well-being 3. Linear taxation. Taxation is linear, i.e.,
with T 2 R the demogrant and t = (t 0 ; t 1 ; : : : ; t J ) 2 R J+1 the tax rates that apply to income and the non-income factors. Linearity is restrictive, but it is nonetheless a good approximation of existing tax-bene…t schemes. 12 We illustrate and justify the construction of well-being as a speci…c cardinalisation of indirect utility. Figure 1 illustrates the construction of well-being in case only income matters; the tax is a general function of income and denoted by (y) in the absence of non-income factors. 
Main result
Proposition 1 characterises the general solution; all proofs can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1. The optimal tax rate vector t = (t 0 ; t 1 ; : : : ; t J ) must satisfy the …rst-order conditions
for j = 0; 1; : : : ; J, with 0 1 and
The left-hand side of each …rst-order condition is-up to the scale factor -the marginal e¢ ciency cost of taxation caused by tax distortions. The inequality aversion parameter r plays indeed no role here. The marginal e¢ ciency cost of taxation approaches zero if the taxed factor cannot be changed by e¤ort ( j ! 0), if the factor is inelastically provided ( j ! 0), or if the tax rate is equal to zero (t j ! 0). It becomes in…nitely large if the tax rate con…scates the complete value of a factor (t j ! j ). As a consequence we have t j < j at the optimum, for all j = 0; 1; : : : ; J.
The right-hand side is the net marginal fairness bene…t of taxation (the term between curly brackets) weighted by the inequality aversion parameter r. If society cares only about e¢ ciency (r ! 0), then taxation only causes distortions and the optimal linear tax scheme, denoted (T ; t ), must coincide with the laisser-faire tax scheme (R 0 ; 0).
The net marginal fairness bene…t of taxation is equal to the marginal compensation bene…t of taxation minus the marginal responsibility cost. The …rst term between curly brackets is the marginal compensation bene…t of taxation. It re ‡ects the fact that higher taxes reduce outcome di¤erences between people with the same tastes, but di¤erent abilities. Viewed in this way, taxation compensates individuals for ability di¤erences, and thus increases welfare. The marginal compensation bene…t depends on the degrees of control and on the variance-covariance structure of abilities.
The second term between curly brackets is the marginal responsibility cost of taxation. Higher taxes also reduce outcome di¤erences between people with the same abilities, but di¤erent tastes. Viewed from this angle, taxation goes against responsibility and thus decreases welfare. The responsibility term therefore enters as a cost. The marginal responsibility cost depends on the degrees of control, the elasticities, and the variance-covariance structure of tastes.
The marginal compensation bene…t of taxation is equal to zero if there is no ability heterogeneity ( ! 0). If everyone has the same ability, then taxation only causes costs-e¢ ciency and responsibility costs-and the laisser-faire will be optimal, as required indeed by the responsibility principle. The marginal responsibility cost of taxation becomes zero if there is no taste heterogeneity ( ! 0). So, if everyone has the same tastes, then the tax rates must balance the e¢ ciency costs and the weighted compensation bene…ts.
To get more insight in the optimal tax structure, and to compare it with the existing literature, we focus next on two special cases. Section 4 starts with the simplest case possible: only income and no non-income factors. Afterwards, we add an exogenous tag to income in section 5.
Income only
We start with the simplest case possible: only income matters. The case is similar to Sheshinski (1972) , but recall that agents di¤er in both abilities and tastes here. The system of …rst-order conditions of proposition 1 reduces to
Responsibility for tastes implies that taxation has a responsibility cost. The optimal income tax rate will therefore be smaller in the presence of taste heterogeneity compared to models with heterogeneity in abilities only. Still, some of the classical comparative statics remain unchanged; see, e.g., Piketty and Saez (2013) . In particular, the optimal income tax rate lies between 0 and 1, decreases with the elasticity of e¤ort 0 , and increases with inequality aversion r.
Fairness requires a higher sensitivity to ability di¤erences compared to taste di¤er-ences. The source of heterogeneity therefore plays a role for the optimal income tax rate.
More ability heterogeneity 00 leads to higher income taxes, while more taste heterogeneity 00 implies lower taxes. The latter e¤ect also occurs in Lockwood and Weinzierl's Proposition 2. The optimal tax rate t 0 on income 1. lies in between the extremes of no taxation and complete taxation, i.e., 0 < t 0 < 1;
2. decreases with the elasticity of e¤ort 0 , from complete taxation in the case of perfectly inelastic e¤ort (t 0 ! 1 if 0 ! 0) to no taxation in the case of perfectly
3. increases with the inequality aversion r, from no taxation if the planner is inequality neutral (t 0 ! 0 if r ! 0) to partial taxation if the planner only cares about
4. increases with ability heterogeneity 00 , from no taxation if everyone has the same ability (t 0 ! 0 if 00 ! 0) to complete taxation if ability becomes extremely
5. decreases with taste heterogeneity 00 , from partial taxation if everyone has the same taste (0 < t 0 < 1 if 00 ! 0) to zero taxation if taste becomes extremely
6. decreases with the degree of control 0 , from complete taxation if income cannot
Adding a tag
Suppose that, in addition to income, there is also a tag, an observable non-controllable non-income factor, as in Akerlof (1978) . The tag in ‡uences well-being directly as a nonincome factor, but, in addition, it may also correlate with-and thus signal-unobserved earnings ability. Taxing or subsidising the tag has therefore two potential e¤ects. It may reduce well-being di¤erences that are directly caused by the tag (via 1 ). In addition, it may also help reduce di¤erences in well-being caused by di¤erences in earnings ability because the tag is correlated with earnings ability (via 10 ). The latter is called tagging.
It has no e¢ ciency cost (the tag is non-controllable), but it is imperfect (the tag is not a perfect signal of earnings ability).
In case of income and a single tag, the system of …rst-order conditions reduces to
with = (1 0 ) + 1 here.
The tax on income in the presence of a tag
In the previous section, the optimal income tax rate t 0 turned out to be smaller in the presence of taste heterogeneity. We explain why it will be even smaller in the presence of a tag. If there is neither a direct e¤ect of the tag on well-being ( 1 ! 0) nor an indirect signalling e¤ect ( 01 ! 0), then equation (3) tells us that taxing or subsidising the tag makes no sense (i.e., t 1 ! 0 is optimal). In this case, equation (2) reduces to equation
(1) and the optimal income tax rates must coincide. In addition, the comparative statics tell us that the optimal income tax rate (in the presence of a tag) decreases with the direct e¤ect of the tag on well-being ( 1 ) and with the absolute value of the covariance between the tag and earnings ability (j 01 j). Combining both results, the optimal tax rate on income will be lower in the presence of a tag.
Although the optimal tax rate on income t 0 will be generically lower compared to the previous section, the comparative statics in proposition 2 remain valid. In addition, the correlation between the tag and unobserved earnings ability plays an interesting role.
In the limiting cases of perfect correlation (( 01 ) 2 ! 00 11 ), the tax rate on income t 0 reduces to zero and all taxation can be done via t 1 , the tax on the tag. This stands to reason because in these cases the tag is a perfect signal of unobserved earnings ability and, being non-controllable, it is a superior tax base as it can be taxed without e¢ ciency cost. Finally, the optimal tax rate on income t 0 increases with the variance of the tag 11 . If the tag becomes more noisy, tagging becomes less interesting relative to taxing income, and the income tax rate therefore increases. Proposition 3 collects the di¤erent results for the optimal tax rate on income in the presence of a tag. 
The tax on the tag
The second …rst-order condition can be rewritten as
The right-hand side consists of two parts, one dealing with the direct e¤ect of the tag and the other with the indirect signalling e¤ect. In the absence of a signalling e¤ect ( 01 ! 0), the optimal (read: fair) tax on the tag is equal to 1 , i.e., the direct e¤ect of the tag should be fully taxed away. In the absence of a direct e¤ect of the tag on well-being ( 1 ! 0), the optimal (read: e¢ cient) tax on the tag reduces to
. Because 1 t 0 > 0 in the optimum (proposition 2, point 1 and proposition 3, point 1), the tax on the tag will be positive (negative) if the tag signals a higher (lower) unobserved ability to earn.
To discuss the comparative statics for t 1 , the tax on the tag, we assume-without loss of generality-a positive correlation between the tag and unobserved earnings ability.
A higher cost of income taxation 0 , less heterogeneity in earnings ability 00 , or more heterogeneity in tastes for earnings e¤ort 00 implies that using an income tax becomes relatively less interesting compared to tagging. The tax on the tag will therefore be higher in these cases. The higher the inequality aversion r, the lower the tax on the tag.
Although counterintuitive at …rst sight, recall that the inequality aversion only a¤ects the tax on the tag via the tax t 0 on income in equation (4) . A higher inequality aversion leads to a higher income tax that in turn reduces the indirect e¤ect of the tag on wellbeing via net income. The e¤ect of control on tagging is not clear a priori. Proposition 2 (point 6) and proposition 3 (point 1) tell us only that in the extreme cases of no control and full control the term (1 t 0 )(1 0 ) in equation (4) is equal to zero. The tax on the tag must then be equal to 1 . Finally, the tax on the tag will be higher, the higher the signalling value of the tag for unobserved ability 01 and the lower the noise of the tag, measured by its variance 11 . So, the tax on the tag will be higher the higher the signal-to-noise ratio 01 = 11 (in case numerator and denominator move in opposite ways).
Proposition 4 summarises the comparative statics for t 1 .
Proposition 4. The optimal tax rate t 1 on the tag 1. will be larger (resp. smaller) than 1 , if the covariance 01 is positive (resp. negative); 2. increases (resp. decreases) with the income elasticity 0 if the covariance 01 is positive (resp. negative); 3. decreases (resp. increases) with ability heterogeneity for earnings 00 if the covariance 01 is positive (resp. negative); 4. increases (resp. decreases) with taste heterogeneity for earnings 00 if the covariance 01 is positive (resp. negative); 5. decreases (resp. increases) with the inequality aversion r if the covariance 01 is positive (resp. negative);
6. is equal to 1 if there is no control over income and if there is full control over income (t 1 ! 1 , if either 0 ! 0 or 0 ! 1); the change of the tax rate with control is unde…ned in general; 13 7. increases with the covariance 01 ; 8. decreases (resp. increases) with 11 if the covariance 01 is positive (resp. negative).
Testable conditions
To set the stage, notice that equation (4) is not testable: we do not observe the degree of control 0 and the covariance between the tag and unobserved earnings ability 01 .
The covariance between the tag x 1 = 1 and gross income y is observable however, and, using equation (17) of the appendix, it can be written as
Equation (4) then becomes
All terms are observable in principle. Suppose for example that the tag is physical ability. The tax rates t 0 and t 1 re ‡ect the tax rate on earnings and invalidity/health bene…ts. The term 1 is the willingness to pay for physical ability-the marginal rate of substitution between net income and physical ability. It can be estimated if one is willing to use happiness data as a proxy for well-being; see, e.g., Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2012). 14 The covariance cov(x 1 ; y) between physical ability and gross income and the variance of physical ability cov(x 1 ; x 1 ) can be easily estimated. In particular, the ratio 1 3 Simulations suggest that t 1 typically follows an inverse U-shaped (resp. U-shaped) pattern with respect to the degree of control if the covariance is positive (resp. negative). 1 4 It has been argued that using self-reported happiness or subjective well-being data gives the researcher direct information on individual well-being and it is not necessary to rely on revealed preferences or estimated individual utilities; see, e.g., the survey by Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006).
cov(x 1 ; y)=cov(x 1 ; x 1 ) is the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of the slope when regressing income y on physical ability x 1 . Equation (6) tells us that the tax rate on the tag should be equal to the direct e¤ect of physical ability on well-being augmented by the indirect e¤ect of physical ability on well-being via its expected e¤ect on net income.
In the remainder of this section, we generalise equation (6) to allow for several nonincome factors. Afterwards, we discuss the empirical implementation and link it to the equality of opportunity literature.
The general case
Consider income and several non-income factors. We partition the set of non-income factors f1; 2; : : : ; Jg in the set of non-controllable factors N = fjj j ! 0g (assumed to be non-empty) and the set of partially controllable factors P = fjj j > 0g. The …rst-order conditions for the non-controllable factors in proposition 1 are equal to 15
Suppose we have data for n individuals in a country on gross incomes and non-income factors, collected in a n 1 vector y, a n jN j matrix X N for the non-controllable factors, and a n jP j matrix X P for the partially controllable factors. All data are assumed to be normalised (the mean is equal to zero). We can replace the population covariances in (7) by their sample equivalents to obtain (in matrix notation)
with t 0 = (t 0 N ; t 0 P ) and 0 = ( 0 N ; 0 P ) collecting the tax rates and the willingness to pay for the non-controllable and partially controllable factors. Because X 0 N X N is invertiblethe (non-controllable) factors are not perfectly correlated by assumption-we get
The iconic term '(X 0 N X N ) 1 X 0 N Z' is the linear projection of the non-controllable factors on either gross income (if Z = y) or on the controllable factors (if Z = X P ). They 1 5 Similar to equation (5), we use the fact that cov(xj; y) = (1 0) 0j ; for all j 2 N and similarly
for all j 2 N and k 2 P .
can be estimated in a multiple linear regression of income and the partially controllable factors on the non-controllable factors, say
X P = X N N P + P :
N 0 is the jN j 1 slope vector with typical element j0 capturing the e¤ect of the non-controllable factor j 2 N on gross income; N P is the jN j jP j slope matrix with typical element jk capturing the e¤ect of the non-controllable factor j 2 N on the controllable factor k 2 P ; and y and P are a vector and matrix of i.i.d. error terms.
Equation (8) tells us that the tax rate on each non-controllable factor j 2 N (the left-hand side) should be equal to the total expected e¤ect of the non-controllable factor on well-being (the right-hand side). This total e¤ect can be split up in the direct e¤ect of each factor on well-being (captured by N ) augmented by the sum of the indirect expected e¤ects of each factor on well-being. This indirect expected e¤ect can run via (1) net income (i.e., the expected e¤ect of a non-controllable factor on gross income, captured by N 0 , multiplied by 1 t 0 to obtain the net e¤ect on well-being) and via (2) the partially controllable non-income factors (i.e., the expected e¤ect of a noncontrollable factor on a partially controllable factor, captured by N P , multiplied by P t P to obtain the net e¤ect on well-being).
Implementation
All variables in the equation system (8) are observable and therefore the system is testable in principle. Rather than obtaining separate estimates of the di¤erent parameters, there is an easy direct way to put the theory to the test if one is willing to use happiness data as a proxy for utility. In the appendix we derive the indirect utility function in equation (19) . It is (in vector notation) equal to
with v the n 1 vector of indirect utilities, c the n 1 vector of net incomes, and constant a vector containing the same constant for each individual.
Suppose we have happiness data collected in a n 1 vector h as a proxy for utility.
We could specify a happiness regression
with h a vector of error terms. We include a parameter to capture the e¤ect of net income on happiness; therefore, we also multiplied the direct e¤ects in = ( N ; P ) with to keep their interpretation as the willingness to pay for the di¤erent non-income factors. Let T be a vector containing the same demogrant for each individual. Net income is in matrix notation equal to c = (1 t 0 )y T X N t N X P t P :
Replacing net income c by (11) in the happiness equation and-taking up T in the constant-the happiness equation becomes
Finally, using equations (9)- (10), we can rewrite the happiness equation as 16
Recall equation (8) . If the tax-bene…t scheme is e¢ cient and fair, then the term between squared brackets in equation (13), the total e¤ect of non-controllable factors on well-being, should be equal to zero. This provides us with a simple test. First, regress happiness h on all non-controllable factors in X N , i.e.,
with N the slopes for the non-controllable factors. Second, test the joint hypothesis that the slope vector N is equal to zero, and, in case it is rejected, test it separately for the di¤erent factors. Irrespective of the test results, the estimated slope vector N can provide valuable information about the total degree of compensation for di¤erent non-controllable factors in di¤erent countries and di¤erent time periods.
Three …nal comments are in order. First, the adopted responsibility cut at the beginning of our paper is to keep individuals responsible for their preferences (tastes).
However, we end up here with regressions that belong to the rivalling control approach, between unobserved abilities and tastes, and (2) the fact that optimal individual e¤ort does not depend on ability. In this case, the two approaches coincide in our model.
Second, it is very likely that the tests will be rejected in many countries for many factors. One explanation could be that societies are only willing to reduce the indirect e¤ect of some non-controllable factors on well-being, but not the direct e¤ect, say, the su¤ering caused by the factor. 17 Or, societies may not fully grasp the complex correlation structure of the di¤erent factors and disregard therefore some of the indirect e¤ects when designing tax schemes. To further investigate such possibilities, one could
1. combine equations (9) and (11) to obtain the regression
Regressing net income c on X N and X P allows therefore to test whether the indirect e¤ ects of the non-controllable factors via income are compensated.
2. combine equations (10) and (11) to obtain
and thus regressing net income c on X N and y allows to test whether the indirect e¤ ects of the non-controllable factors via the non-income factors are fully compensated.
3. combine equations (9), (10), and (11) to obtain
Regressing net income c on X N allows to test whether all indirect e¤ ects of the non-controllable factors are fully compensated.
4. regress happiness h on y, X N , and X P -as in equation (12)-to test whether t N = N , i.e., whether only the direct e¤ ect of the tag is compensated.
This framework is related to the empirical approach to inequality of opportunity. In this literature, practitioners distinguish between exogenous circumstances (X N in our notation) and endogenous e¤ort (X P in our notation). Third, estimating inequality of opportunity-the relative share of total inequality that can be attributed to circumstances-typically starts from estimating equations (9), (14), or (16) 
Conclusion
Fairness plays a role in redistribution. Individuals want to compensate for misfortunes, but also allow each other to enjoy the fruits of their e¤ort. Such fairness considerations have been introduced in political economy and optimal income tax models. We introduce fairness as a device to select among e¢ cient tax-bene…t schemes based on income and non-income factors under partial control.
In general, optimal tax rates weigh the marginal e¢ ciency cost of taxation caused by tax distortions against the marginal net fairness bene…t of taxation. The latter combines two e¤ects. The marginal compensation bene…t of taxation captures the fairness bene…t that higher taxes reduce outcome di¤erences between individuals with the same tastes, but di¤erent abilities. The marginal responsibility cost of taxation measures the fairness cost that higher taxes also reduce the outcome di¤erences between individuals with the same abilities, but di¤erent tastes.
We also study two special cases in detail. In case only income is included in the model, we show, among other things, that the optimal income tax negatively depends on the degree of control over income and on the heterogeneity in abilities and tastes in opposite ways. If we also add a tag to income, then the same conditions hold for the optimal income tax while the optimal tax on the tag depends on its direct e¤ect on well-being and on its correlation with the ability to earn income.
The theoretical analysis suggests lower taxes on income and higher taxes on noncontrollable non-income factors. While taxes on gender, age, and race are forbidden de jure by anti-discrimination laws, many tax-bene…t schemes contain such taxes de facto. For instance, most existing tax systems have at least some elements of (or even complete) joint taxation. This punishes the secondary earner-usually the wife-with higher marginal tax rates. Thus, it would be interesting to bring our theory to the data and to investigate how existing tax systems (explicitly or implicitly) tax the various factors.
While we also derive testable conditions for the general case and discuss the empirical implementation, we leave the empirical estimation for future research. Several problems arise, and any estimation will have to satisfactorily deal with these issues. Panel data and …xed e¤ects are preferably used to capture unobserved heterogeneity. Fixed e¤ects estimation requires the non-controllable factors to vary over time. While this is probably true for disability, it is not true for gender or parental background. Also factors like age-if included-may be problematic as it is notoriously di¢ cult to disentangle cohort, time, and age e¤ects; see, e.g., Deaton and Paxson (1994) . It is a priori not clear, however, whether age should be included at all in the analysis, e.g., if the goal is to look at average life-cycle utility (see, e.g., Weinzierl, 2011) . One must also be sure that the included factors are non-controllable, which is not always easy to say, think, e.g., of being an immigrant in a country. Even if these problems were solved, potential identi…cation problems remain. Bias caused by omitted variables, for example, is likely, as it is not possible to observe true abilities and tastes. To tackle these issues, exploiting sibling correlations might be a fruitful avenue.
Principles underlying the social preference relation
We prove that the social preference relation satis…es the Pareto principle, compensation, and responsibility. We start with the individual utility maximisation problem, being
subject to the following constraints
x j = j e j + (1 j ) j for all j = 1; 2; : : : ; J:
De…ne 0 = 1. The J + 1 …rst order conditions are
and lead to optimal e¤ort choices 18
for all j = 0; 1; : : : ; J:
The corresponding gross income, non-income factors, and consumption are equal to
From now on we use (T; t) rather than to refer to a tax scheme. Indirect utility is denoted V (T; t; ; ) and is equal to leading to v(T; t; ; ) = (T; t)
We are now ready to prove the properties of the social ranking. First of all, for each taste vector , well-being v is a strictly increasing (a¢ ne) transformation of V . We indeed have v(T; t; ; ) = a( ) + b V (T; t; ; );
Because welfare is strictly increasing in well-being and well-being is strictly increasing in indirect utility, the social preference relation satis…es the Pareto principle, i.e., a higher utility for everyone (and strictly higher for at least one individual) implies a (strictly) higher social welfare.
Second, the social welfare weight of an individual with type ( ; ) is equal to the derivative of welfare w.r.t. well-being multiplied by the derivative of well-being w.r.t. income. In the current setting, we obtain exp( rv(T; t; ; )) R R exp( rv(T; t; ; ))dF ( ) dG ( ) b;
with @v(T; t; ; )=@T = b the marginal well-being of income. The relative social welfare weight of two individuals is thus inversely related to their well-being level. If two individuals have the same tastes, then the one with the lower well-being level will get priority, i.e., a transfer from the better o¤ to the worse o¤-if it were feasible-improves social welfare as required by the compensation principle. In the laisser-faire-de…ned as (T; t) = (R 0 ; 0)-individuals with the same abilities have the same well-being. Indeed, we have
; for all R 0 ; ; ; 0 . As a consequence, such individuals have the same social welfare weight. If all individuals have the same abilities, then their social welfare weight is the same in the laisser-faire. Any redistribution would be both ine¢ cient (distortive) and inequality-increasing, thus the laisser-faire will be optimal as required by the responsibility principle.
Proof of proposition 1
The planner chooses a tax scheme to maximise
subject to the budget constraint
We rewrite the budget constraint and the welfare function on the basis of the assumptions made. For ease of exposition, we de…ne 0 = 1.
With linear taxes, the budget constraint is equal to
with y , x j ; j = 1; 2; : : : ; J de…ned in equations (17)- (18) and F and G multivariate normal distributions, with and the vector of means. Plugging in the di¤erent expressions, we can rewrite the budget constraint as
Because e¢ ciency requires the budget constraint to be satis…ed with equality, the lumpsum tax T can be written as a function of the tax rates, i.e.,
Welfare is equal to
with v de…ned in equation (21) and F and G multivariate normal distributions. Plugging in equation (21), welfare can be decomposed as W = A + B + C, with
with = P J j=0 j (1 j ) > 0 and de…ned in equation (20) . We rewrite the di¤erent components A, B, and C.
Using equations (20) and (22), we directly get
To rewrite B and C, note that the moment-generating function of a normally distributed
We get
Welfare W = A+B +C is a function of tax rates t = (t 0 ; t 1 ; : : : ; t J ) only. Maximising welfare leads to a system of …rst-order conditions of the form
Putting everything together we obtain
for each j = 0; 1; : : : ; J, as required. 1 9 The double sums in B and C are of the generic form P J i=0 P J j=0 ' i (ti)' j (tj) ij , and its partial derivative with respect to tj is equal to 2
Proof of proposition 2 If only income matters, then the …rst-order condition is
The proof of proposition 2 turns out to be a special case of proposition 3 (point 1). We will come back to it in the next section.
Proof of proposition 3
Suppose there are two variables, income y and an exogenous tag x 1 (thus, 1 ! 0). The …rst-order conditions reduce to
(1 t 0 ) (1 0 ) 01 + ( 1 t 1 ) 11 = 0;
The second …rst-order condition requires
which can be plugged in in the …rst condition, to get
Note three things. First, equation (25) does not depend on t 1 and therefore completely describes the solution for income tax rate t 0 . Second, the term ( 00 ( 01 ) 2 = 11 )
is strictly positive because the squared correlation ( 01 ) 2 = 00 11 is assumed to be strictly smaller than 1. Third, if the tag has no direct e¤ect ( 1 = 0) or indirect e¤ect ( 01 = 0) on well-being, then equation (25) reduces to equation (23); therefore proposition 3 also proves proposition 2 as a special case.
Point 1. The optimal tax rate t 0 on income satis…es the properties mentioned in proposition 2 (we call them points 1.1-1.6 in the sequel). point 1.1. The optimal tax rate t 0 on income lies in between the extremes of no taxation and complete taxation, i.e., 0 < t 0 < 1.
If t 0 0 in the optimum, then the left-hand side of equation (25) is strictly positive and the …rst-order condition cannot be satis…ed; so t 1 > 0 must hold at the optimum. If t 0 approaches 1, then t 0 1 t 0 approaches +1, the left-hand side of equation (25) becomes strictly negative, and the …rst-order condition cannot be satis…ed; so also t 0 < 1 must hold at the optimum. point 1.2. The optimal tax rate t 0 on income decreases with the elasticity 0 , ranging from complete taxation in the case of perfectly inelastic e¤ort (t 0 ! 1 if 0 ! 0) to no taxation in the case of perfectly elastic e¤ort (t 0 ! 0 if 0 ! +1). If 0 ! 0, then the …rst-order condition reduces to
which is satis…ed i¤ t 0 ! 1. If 0 ! +1, then …rst divide both sides of equation (25) by ( 0 ) 2 > 0 and consider the limiting case 0 ! +1 to get
which is satis…ed i¤ t 0 ! 0. The comparative statics show that taxes decrease with 0 ,
is negative indeed, given 0 < t 0 < 1 in the optimum. which implies t 0 ! 0. To investigate the case r ! +1, divide …rst both sides of (25) by r > 0, take the limit r ! +1, and solve for t 0 to obtain
which will typically result in partial taxation. The comparative statics are given by
We can rewrite the numerator, using equation (25) , to obtain
which is positive, indeed, given 0 < t 0 < 1 in the optimum. point 1.4. The optimal tax rate t 0 on income increases with ability heterogeneity 00 , ranging from no taxation if everyone has the same ability (t 0 ! 0 if 00 ! 0) to complete taxation if ability becomes extremely heterogeneous (t 0 ! 1 if 00 ! +1).
If 00 ! 0 (and thus also 01 ! 0), then equation (25) reduces to
which leads to t 0 ! 0. If 00 ! +1, then divide …rst both sides of (25) by 00 > 0, take the limit 00 ! +1, and equation (25) reduces to
which implies t 0 ! 1. The comparative statics for t 0 w.r.t. 00 are equal to
which is positive, given 0 < t 0 < 1 in the optimum. point 1.5. The optimal tax rate t 0 on income decreases with taste heterogeneity 00 , ranging from partial taxation if everyone has the same taste (0 < t 0 < 1 if 00 ! 0) to zero taxation if taste becomes extremely heterogeneous (t 0 ! 0 if 00 ! +1).
which can lead to any tax rate in between 0 and 1. If 00 ! +1, then divide …rst both sides of (25) by 00 > 0, take the limit 00 ! +1, and equation (25) reduces to
which implies t 0 ! 0. Comparative statics are given by
which is negative, as required. point 1.6. The optimal tax rate t 0 on income decreases with the degree of control 0 , ranging from complete taxation if income cannot be controlled (t 0 ! 1 if 0 ! 0) to no taxation if income is fully controlled (t 0 ! 0 if 0 ! 1).
If 0 ! 0, equation (25) reduces to
which implies t 0 ! 1. If 0 ! 1, equation (25) reduces to
which is satis…ed i¤ t 0 ! 0. The comparative statics for t 0 w.r.t. 0 are given by
We can multiply the numerator and denominator by 0 = 0 (1 0 + 1 ) > 0 and use equation (25) to replace 0 0
in the numerator, to obtain (after some manipulation)
which is negative, given 0 < t 0 < 1 in the optimum.
Point 2. The optimal tax rate t 0 on income decreases with the direct e¤ect of the tag on well-being 1 .
The comparative statics for t 0 w.r.t. 1 is given by 
Point 3. The optimal tax rate t 0 on income follows an inverse U-shaped pattern with respect to the covariance between the tag and earnings ability 01 , starting and ending at no taxation in case of perfect correlation (t 0 ! 0 if ( 01 ) 2 ! 00 11 ) and reaching a maximum in case of no correlation ( 01 = 0). The sign of dt 0 =d 01 is indeed inversely related to the sign of 01 , leading to an inverse U-shaped pattern.
Point 4. The optimal tax rate t 0 on income increases with 11 .
The comparative statics for t 0 w.r. which is positive, given 0 < t 0 < 1 in the optimum.
Proof of proposition 4
Point 1. The optimal tax rate t 1 on the tag will be larger (resp. smaller) than 1 , if the covariance 01 is positive (resp. negative)
Using proposition 3 (point 1.1 in the proof) we must have 0 < t 0 < 1. Using equation (24) , this implies indeed that t 1 T 1 holds if 01 T 0.
Point 2. The optimal tax rate t 1 on the tag increases (resp. decreases) with the income elasticity 0 if the covariance 01 is positive (resp. negative).
The comparative statics of t 1 w.r.t. Point 3. The optimal tax rate t 1 on the tag decreases (resp. increases) with ability heterogeneity for earnings 00 if the covariance 01 is positive (resp. negative). corresponds therefore with the sign of 01 .
Point 5. The optimal tax rate t 1 on the tag decreases (resp. increases) with the inequality aversion r if the covariance 01 is positive (resp. negative).
The comparative statics of t 1 w.r.t. r are with the sign of is inversely related to the sign of 01 .
